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Commodiﬁcation of nature refers to the expansion of market trade to previously non-marketed spheres.
This is a contested issue both in the scientiﬁc literature and in policy deliberations. The aim of this paper
is to analytically clarify and distinguish between different purposes and degrees of commodiﬁcation and
to focus attention to the safeguards: the detailed institutional design. We identify six degrees of com-
modiﬁcation and ﬁnd that all ecosystem services policies are associated with some degree of commo-
diﬁcation but only the two highest degrees can properly be associated with neoliberalisation of nature.
For example, most payments for ecosystem services (PES) are subsidy-like government compensations
not based on monetary valuation of nature. Biodiversity offsets can be designed as market schemes or
non-market regulations; the cost-effectiveness of markets cannot be assumed. To avoid the confusion
around the concept ‘market-based instrument’ we suggest replacing it with ‘economic instruments’ since
relying on the price signal is not the same thing as relying on the market. We provide a comprehensive
framework emphasising the diversity in institutional design, valuation approaches and role of markets.
This provides ﬂexibility and options for policy integration of biodiversity and ecosystem services in
different countries according to their political and cultural context.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Valuation of ecosystem services (ES) and the use of economic
instruments are increasingly becoming part of the international
discussions on scaling-up biodiversity ﬁnancing. The Convention
of Biological Diversity (CBD) states that “biodiversity values”
should be integrated into development strategies, planning pro-
cesses, national accounts, and reporting systems (Aichi Biodi-
versity Target 2) and calls for the elimination of harmful subsidies
as well as the development of “positive incentives for the con-
servation and sustainable use of biodiversity” (Target 3).1
The focus on biodiversity values and ‘Innovative FinancialB.V. This is an open access article
su.se (M. Schultz),Mechanisms’ (IFMs) has for some actors become extremely con-
troversial within the CBD process, especially the use of economic
instruments like payments for ecosystem services (PES) and bio-
diversity offsets.2 Without appropriate institutional arrangements
that safeguard (ensure) biodiversity and equity, there is a risk that
economic instruments, as well as other types of policy instru-
ments, will not contribute towards the three CBD objectives
(Ituarte-Lima et al., 2014). These are (i) conservation of biological
diversity, (ii) the sustainable use of its components, and iii) the fair
and equitable sharing of the beneﬁts arising out of the utilisation
of genetic resources. The CBD calls for a broader governance ap-
proach to valuation and ﬁnancing so that the IFMs do not “un-
dermine achievement of the Convention’s three objectives” (CBD,
2010). This motivates a focus on safeguards, which we deﬁne as
the speciﬁc factors in the institutional design and implementationunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
2 E.g. the CBD COP-10 meeting in Nagoya, Japan, October 2010, failed to agree
on Innovative Financial Mechanism (Biodiversity Financing Mechanisms) which
motivated a special Dialogue Seminar in March 2012 to resolve these issues, see
Farooqui and Schultz (2012).
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outcomes.
The risks of using market-based instruments for ﬁnancing
biodiversity and ES range from ethical arguments about trans-
forming human-nature relations by “commodity fetishism” (Kosoy
and Corbera, 2010) and crowding-out moral obligations as motives
for nature protection e.g. (Luck et al., 2012), to instrumentalist
arguments focused on the efﬁciency and equity of the processes
and outcomes of such schemes e.g. (Corbera et al., 2007). This is
often associated to neoliberalism. Based on McAfee and Shapiro
(2010), we deﬁne neoliberal ES policies as instruments designed
on the premise that the market allocates scarce ecological re-
sources more efﬁciently than ‘command-and-control’ regulations
and treaties.
Normative framings of ES and commodiﬁcation are important
but sometimes become an obstacle to addressing the empirical
instrumental question of how different economic incentive
schemes actually perform (Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez,
2011: 622; Dempsey and Robertson, 2012). In this paper we em-
phasise an instrumentalist approach. The aim is to analytically
clarify and distinguish between different purposes and degrees of
commodiﬁcation and to refocus attention on the detailed institu-
tional design of policy instruments, in particular controversial
economic instruments.
This paper interrogates the concepts of commodiﬁcation, va-
luation, and markets in order to build a framework for policy in-
tegration of ES, i.e. addressing and integrating ES concerns in
sector policy making (Nilsson and Persson, 2003). Based on this
framework, we further analyse the foundations for payments for
ecosystem services (PES) and biodiversity offsets, to explore a
menu of options for tailoring these instruments to accommodate
country-speciﬁc concerns. Since biodiversity and most ES are
much more difﬁcult to measure than carbon dioxide and other
emissions, our framework of commodiﬁcation is not directly
transferable to pollution quotas, carbon markets or emission-
trading systems.3 Here understood as “howmuch water is needed by a river and when, in order
to support the river’s basic ecological functions” (Groenfeldt and Schmidt, 2013: 2).
4 http://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/24/peoples-agreement/ Accessed 27
November 2014.
5 Ecuador became the ﬁrst country to adopt a Constitutional provision en-
dowing nature with inalienable rights. The Constitution recognises that “Nature or
Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, has the right to exist, persist,
maintain itself and regenerate its own vital cycles, structure, functions and its
evolutionary processes” (Burdon, 2011).
6 See http://www.ine.gob.bo/indicadoresddhh/archivos/alimentacion/nal/Ley%
20N%C2%BA%20071.Pdf and http://www.planiﬁcacion.gob.bo/sites/folders/marco-
legal/Ley%20N%C2%B0%20300%20MARCO%20DE%20LA%20MADRE%20TIERRA.pdf2. Six degrees of commodiﬁcation
Commodiﬁcation of biodiversity and ES means, broadly
speaking, the expansion of market trade to previously non-mar-
keted areas of the environment (Luck et al., 2012). This is often
described as a process related to idea of commensurability un-
derlying monetary valuation (Aldred, 2002; Vatn, 2009). Kosoy
and Corbera (2010) identify three necessary stages in commodi-
ﬁcation: ﬁrst deﬁning an ecosystem service, second assigning an
exchange-value, and third create a market. Adding property rights,
Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez (2011) identify four main stages
of commodiﬁcation: (i) economic utilitarian framing, (ii) monetary
valuation, (iii) appropriating the value of ES through formalisation
of property rights, and (iv) commercialisation, i.e. market trade by
PES or offsets.
However, these stages need not be consecutive and the process
is not necessarily unidirectional or irreversible (Gómez-Baggethun
and Ruiz-Pérez, 2011), hence we use degrees rather than stages.
Based on Muradian et al. (2010: 1206), we deﬁne the degree of
commodiﬁcation as the extent to which the value of biodiversity
or an ecosystem service has become a tradable commodity.
We ﬁnd it useful to analyse commodiﬁcation in terms of policy
integration and in this more empirical context at least two more
degrees need to be added, as well as the zero degree (policy in-
tegration without commodiﬁcation). The justiﬁcation for these
degrees is discussed below. Empirically, the degree of commodi-
ﬁcation is a matter of the institutional design of a particular policy
instrument. The stated purpose of introducing this policyinstrument is tailored to the speciﬁc ideological orientation of the
government and can be observed e.g. in national legislation and
underlying government bills. Together, the degree (institutional
design) and stated purpose (justiﬁcation) inﬂuence the legitimacy
of the instrument. When the detailed institutional arrangements
are analysed we ﬁnd that what are generally described as PES and
biodiversity offsets may involve different degrees of commercia-
lisation and hence commodiﬁcation. Hence, we ﬁnd it useful to
distinguish between six degrees (plus the zero degree) of
commodiﬁcation:
0. “No commodiﬁcation” (zero degree) includes intrinsic or
relational appreciation of ecosystems, in which the rationale for
protecting nature is nature itself. ‘Relational’ include indigenous
cosmologies emphasising reciprocity and cyclical processes (MA,
2005a: 86–87) as well as interaction for reasons of spirituality and
even subsistence farming (Turnhout et al., 2013). The policy op-
tions include long-established policy instruments with no com-
modiﬁcation such as national parks and nature reserves as well as
the more recent notion of ‘environmental ﬂow’ in water
governance3 when justiﬁed by deontological ethics (moral duties)
or nature’s intrinsic values. This also includes approaches linked to
the rights of nature or the inalienable rights of indigenous peoples
to sustain their cultural and sacred practices (the viability of bio-
cultural sites for cultural and sacred practices are often linked with
protecting intrinsic values of biodiversity).
International legal and policy options involving no commodi-
ﬁcation include new legal paradigms recognising rights of nature
which have been characterised as “Earth Jurisprudence” (Burdon,
2011). As part of this, Higgins et al. (2013) question the belief that
the market will provide effective and efﬁcient remedies and have
proposed “Ecocide” as part of international criminal law which
would aim to pre-empt, prevent and prohibit mass damage, de-
struction or loss of ecosystems whether committed during or
outside of war-time as well as impose an associated legal duty of
care upon persons in positions of superior responsibility. Other
international initiatives include the World People’s Conference on
Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth,4 Global Alliance
for the Rights of Nature, and the Community Environmental Legal
Defence Fund (Daly, 2012). At the national level, examples of in-
trinsic values include the recent Constitutional recognition of the
rights of nature in Ecuador (Burdon, 2011)5 and rights of Mother
Earth and good living in Bolivia's Law 071 and Law 300.6
1. The ﬁrst degree of commodiﬁcation arises under the instru-
mental (or even economic) framing of nature, though without
explicit efforts at valuation. The separation of humans and
nature and hence an instrumental view of nature can be found
already in the works of Francis Bacon (1561–1626) (Merchant,
1980). The expansion of this instrumental framing to include
ecosystem processes was popularised by e.g. Ehrlich and
Mooney (1983) and Daily (1997). Since The Millennium Ecosys-
tem Assessment (MA, 2005) ecosystem services and instrumen-
tal framing have become mainstream in environmental policy
although this may not involve monetary (economic) valuation
Table 1
Degrees of commodiﬁcation in terms of policy instruments for biodiversity and ecosystem services.
Degree of commodif. Main category Examples
0 Moral suasion and regulations justiﬁed by intrinsic value  Information appealing to moral responsibility.
 Recognising social equity and nature’s intrinsic value, e.g. endangered species acts
and nature reserves
1 Non-monetary regulations based on instrumental
arguments
 Nature reserves and other land-use plans focusing on nature’s instrumental value
to human wellbeing
2 Non-monetary regulations based on physical metrics
(units of nature)
 Ecological compensation with no role for price signals or market transactions
3 Non-monetary regulations designed to maximise eco-
nomic efﬁciency
 City park designed and managed to maximise calculated recreation values
4 Economic instruments (not traded)  Taxes and subsidies
 Subsidy-like PES paid by governments
5 Economic instruments (voluntary market trade)  Market-like PES
 Markets for ecosystem services (MES), e.g. biodiversity offsets trading conservation
credits
6 Financial instruments  Forest bonds
 Biodiversity derivatives
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Even if instrumental framing has often been put forward as the
ﬁrst step of commodiﬁcation (e.g. Kosoy and Corbera (2010) and
Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez (2011)), there is little infor-
mation on how this can be assessed. We suggest that the
difference between an intrinsic (relational) and instrumental
framing (zero vs. ﬁrst degree) can be assessed by analysing the
institutional design of the policy instrument, including the
detailed management prescriptions (see Tables 1 and 2). There
is no sharp demarcation line and many countries may use both
framings for the same policy instrument.
2. The second degree of commodiﬁcation occurs when policy
makers introduce “new” property rights and liabilities which
involve measurements of biodiversity or ecosystem service
units but without monetary valuation or price signals. An ex-
ample of this is biodiversity offsets or ecological compensation
and the idea is that a company that develops land and water
resources for e.g. mining, housing, industries, infrastructure, etc.
should compensate for the degradation of biodiversity and ES
by investing in these values elsewhere (Conway et al., 2013).
This could be voluntary or mandatory. Degradation (i.e. negative
impacts) should, according to the mitigation hierarchy, ﬁrst be
avoided by choosing a site with less ecological values for the
development project. Once a site has been approved for
exploitation, degradation should be minimised. The third step
of the mitigation hierarchy (sometimes included in the second
step) is that the developer takes rehabilitation or restoration
measures on the ecosystems impacted and the ﬁnal step
consists of offset measures outside the developed area to
compensate for signiﬁcant adverse residual impacts (Dickie
et al., 2010).
Biodiversity offsets are often used synonymously with ecologi-
cal compensation but while biodiversity offsets speciﬁcally seek
measurable units to deliver no net loss (or net gain) of
conservation outcomes, “ecological compensation is a broader
term” (Conway et al., 2013: 2). In the scope of this paper, we
focus on mandatory programs and let the use of market
transactions deﬁne the difference between these instruments,
so that biodiversity offsets use the market while ecological
compensation does not (we will elaborate on the meaning of
‘markets’ later).
With this demarcation, ecological compensation belongs to the
2nd degree of commodiﬁcation while biodiversity offsets be-
long to the 5th level. Ecological compensation is common in the
European Union, e.g. development within Natura 2000 sites
needs to be compensated for and this is done case-by-case by
government agencies. On ordinary (non-protected) land, theGerman compensation pools is an established policy instrument
where the weighing of degradation and compensation as well
as the decision of how much and which land should be used for
compensation are done by municipal or private agencies,
appointed by the state. Having a pool of compensation land to
choose from facilitates the process of matching sites and
enables the agency to consider habitat connectivity like green
corridors. Even if the German compensation pools sometimes
are referred to as “habitat banks” (e.g. Conway et al., 2013: 106),
it is clear that there is very limited role for the market in
determining price or quality (Conway et al., 2013:113–115). The
Western Cape Biodiversity Offset program in South Africa
(Dickie et al., 2010: 51) would also be an ecological compensa-
tion program with our deﬁnition (Koh et al., 2014).
3. The third degree involves deliberate efforts to express or ‘de-
monstrate’ (TEEB, 2010: 11) the value of nature in monetary
terms (monetary valuation). As mentioned already, this has
been referred to as step towards commodiﬁcation. Still, we are
hesitant to include it as a degree since monetary valuation is
‘only’ an analytical calculation which is not necessary as
decision support to justify economic instruments. We have
chosen to include it because it introduces commensurability
(expressing ES in monetary terms) (Aldred, 2002). Furthermore,
Neuteleers and Engelen (2015) argue that monetary valuation
contributes to real commodiﬁcation and therefore “paves the
way (discursively and sometimes technically) for commodiﬁca-
tion to happen” (Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez, 2011: 624).
For example, a nature reserve targeted at biodiversity conserva-
tion has probably different management prescriptions com-
pared to a nature reserve designed and managed to maximise
recreation values based on cost-beneﬁt calculus (Table 1).
Furthermore, when governments demand a cost-beneﬁt analy-
sis of nature reserves, although in the short run institutional
design may remain unaltered, in the long run alteration seems
likely if nature reserves are provided by private and public
landowners just like subsidy-like PES program.
Sometimes ‘valuation’ is used as shorthand for ‘monetary
valuation’ although ‘valuation’ is much broader and may involve
anything between two extreme approaches; (i) a qualitative
understanding and appreciation of the importance of the
underlying ecological processes (Daily, 1997) and (ii) a monetary
expression of the ﬁnal ES “directly enjoyed” by people (Boyd
and Banzhaf, 2007: 619). The ﬁrst approach is central for
ecological economics. It emphasises multi-functionality and
the role of biodiversity (in genes, species, and ecosystems) to
support and sustain livelihoods, especially the role of resilience.
Such valuation is mainly expressed in non-monetary terms,
Table 2
Framework for ES valuation and policy integration
Information in
Qualitative terms Quantitative terms Monetary terms
Stated purpose (as observed in
national legislation)
Concern for non-measurable objectives like
social equity, precautionary principle and
safeguarding the insurance value of
biodiversity.
Concern for reaching quantitative targets in
cost-effective ways without expressing tar-
gets in monetary terms.
Concern for economic efﬁciency ex-
pressed in monetary terms and justiﬁed
as a means to internalise externalities.
Methods for describing va-
lues. Decision-support.
SWOT analysis, identiﬁcation, historical as-
sessment, narratives, stakeholder consulta-
tion, Delphi methods, multicriteria analysis.
Technical/scientiﬁc mapping and assess-
ment of trends e.g. water ﬂows, pollination,
and species abundance, multicriteria
analysis.
Cost-beneﬁt analysis is the frame, meth-
ods for monetary valuation include re-
placement cost, contingent valuation,
and hedonic pricing.
Policy integration by non-
monetary regulation and
without market trade (DC 0,
1, 2, 3)
Land use planning, protected areas, and
species acts targeted to intrinsic values (DC0)
or instrumental values (DC1).
Land use planning, protected areas, and
species acts designed to reach measurable
targets (DC0 or DC1 depending on institu-
tional design).
Land use planning and protected areas
designed to maximise economic efﬁ-
ciency. (DC1 or DC3 depending on in-
stitutional design).
N/A Liability for ecological compensation, using




market trade). (DC 4)
Subsidy-like PES paid by governments tar-
geted at high biodiversity, multiple ES or
poverty areas, e.g. EU agri-env. and PES in
Ecuador and Costa Rica.
Subsidy-like PES paid by governments tar-
geted at well-deﬁned measurable units, e.g.
PES for carnivores in Sweden.
PES when payment is informed by the
stated value of the targeted ecosystem
service, not by opportunity costs, e.g.
Wimmera, Australia.
Economic instruments (mar-
ket trade) (DC 5)
N/A Biodiversity offsets trading conservation credits, e.g. US habitat banking, and market-
like PES ﬁnanced by users, e.g. Vittel watershed in France.
Monetary value set by market actors.
Financial instruments (DC 6) N/A N/A Monetary value set by markets, e.g. bio-
diversity derivatives.
DC¼Degree of Commodiﬁcation. N/A¼Not applicable
The examples provided are described in text.
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cesses and human wellbeing. It belongs to the ﬁrst degree of
commodiﬁcation. The second approach could be appropriate
when the purpose of valuing ES is to integrate these values in
national accounting and reporting systems (Fisher et al., 2009),
e.g. in accordance to Aichi Target 2.
In between these extremes are two versions of monetary
valuation that belong to the same box in Table 2 but still are
ontologically different. The ﬁrst version can be exempliﬁed by
replacement cost and avoided cost methods which are the most
common methods for estimating the value of regulating ser-
vices in monetary terms (Pascual et al., 2010: 206). These
methods focus on the consequences of particular choices rather
than preferences. The second version include methods analys-
ing stated or revealed preferences. These are rooted in the
neoclassical idea that the value of nature depends on human
preferences. As a contrast, ecological economics is rooted in the
idea that nature has value to human wellbeing regardless
whether we understand it or not (Daily et al., 2000).
An important objection to using stated or revealed preferences
to inform policy is that the “outcome of economic valuation is in
this respect not more informed than the people whose values
are being assessed” (Daily et al., 2000: 396). The ideal, to
simulate markets, is also inappropriate because market prices
do not only reﬂect present knowledge but also present institu-
tions (Bromley, 1990; Vatn, 2010). Finding 4 of the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment states that the present ecosystem chal-
lenges can be met but this requires “signiﬁcant changes in
policies, institutions and practices that are not currently under
way.”7 These signiﬁcant changes would dramatically alter all
relative prices in the economy and make “economic advice
derived within the neoclassical paradigm… especially inap-
propriate” (Rammel and van den Bergh, 2003: 122).
In other words, it is questionable to use price tags, derived from7 http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdfexisting undesirable institutions, preferences, and wealth dis-
tribution, to inform us on what institutions would be ‘efﬁcient.’
To do so would imply a strong bias in favour of status quo
(Schmid, 1987: 213). This approach to valuation reﬂects the
consumer tastes and institutional arrangements that together
have undermined sustainability. We know from game theory
that it is impossible to escape the suboptimal non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium of the prisoners’ dilemma as long as the
market behaviour and institutions, which results in the Nash
equilibrium, are used as a norm for valuation and collective
action.
4. In the fourth degree taxes and subsidies are used to enhance
ecosystem values. These monetary incentives employ the price
signal in the Pigouvian sense to internalise externalities and
evoke behavioural change but do not create markets: taxes and
subsidies are not traded. The level of the tax or subsidy may or
may not be informed by a monetary valuation, hence the third
degree of commodiﬁcation is not needed for the fourth degree.
Often the government seeks to determine a level of taxation or
subsidy that results in the desired effect. For example, the level
of a subsidy/payment for farming organically is set to com-
pensate a sufﬁcient number of farmers for the forgone net
beneﬁts (opportunity costs) compared to conventional farming.
In other words, it is the harvest decrease of wheat and potatoes
that is commodiﬁed, not the expected increase in biodiversity
and ES.
Indeed, the large public PES (agri-environment) programs in
Europe are “Pigouvian-type PES” (Sattler and Matzdorf, 2013: 3)
and hard to distinguish from more traditional subsidy pro-
grams. Sometimes this is called compensation for ecosystem
services (CES) rather than PES (McAfee and Shapiro, 2010).
Globally, CES or government-ﬁnanced subsidy-like PES consti-
tutes 97–99 percent of all biodiversity-PES, the lower ﬁgure for
developing countries (Milder et al., 2010; Vatn, 2015), if we
exclude biodiversity offsets and eco-certiﬁcation like organic
food in our deﬁnition of PES. Subsidy-like PES belong to the 4th
degree of commodiﬁcation whereas the more market-oriented
9 Mandatory offset programs embrace USD 380 million/year but the distribu-
tion of payments between public agencies and private developers is not known.
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et al. (2008) refer to as pure PES, belong to the 5th degree
(Table 1). We explain more fully market and market-based
below.
The well-known Costa Rican PES program Pago por Servicios
Ambimentales (PSA) was launched in 1996 as a “neoliberal
market mechanism” but should more properly be labelled a
government “subsidy in disguise” (Fletcher and Breitling, 2012):
402). This is because it was largely ﬁnanced through a carbon
tax and water tariffs, enabled by a new Forest Law that banned
land-use change but not sustainable use, and targeted high
poverty areas and “biological corridors” (Matulis, 2013: 256). If
the institutions of PSA would be consistent to the stated
purpose, this program would ﬁt in the 5th degree of commo-
diﬁcation, not the 4th degree (Table 2). Another national PES
program in Ecuador, Programa Socio Bosque (PSB) has avoided
connotations to payments and market (and may therefore be
called CES). Instead the stated purpose of the government in
Ecuador has been combining ecosystem conservation with
poverty alleviation (De Koning et al., 2011) by connecting it to
the rights of Nature (Madre Tierra) as well as people’s rights to a
good way of living (buen vivir).8 Such payments can be seen as
rewards for good stewardship rather than economic incentive
(Muradian et al., 2013). The degree of commodiﬁcation is the
same for the Costa Rican PES and the Ecuadorian PES/CES, but
the governments used different stated purposes to adapt to
different cultural or political contexts (Farooqui and Schultz,
2012).
Government-ﬁnanced biodiversity-PES schemes typically target
a commodity with fuzzy characteristics, based on assumptions
about the relationship between a certain land use and the
provision of desired but often non-explicit outcomes for biodi-
versity and ES (Wunder et al., 2008:839). For example, Eur-
opean agri-environment schemes pay farmers for grazing land
and organic farming although it is not clear exactly which
species or ES beneﬁt from such land use. The same is true for
Costa Rica where forest cover is regarded as a proxy for
biodiversity conservation (Porras et al., 2013). As a result, it is
rather one hectare of forest or agricultural land under a speciﬁc
land-use that is commodiﬁed, not the desired species or ES
themselves (Muradian et al., 2010). Hence, unlike carbon-PES,
government-ﬁnanced subsidy-like biodiversity-PES should not
be interpreted as price tags on speciﬁc units of nature although
it constitutes a high degree (4) of commodiﬁcation.
Wunder et al. (2008):843) identiﬁed only one PES program
where providers are paid according to measured units actually
delivered and that is payments by the Swedish government to
indigenous Sami communities for documented presence and
reproductions of wolves, wolverine and lynx on reindeer graz-
ing land. A systemwhere the monetary value is determined by a
government auction, e.g. the Wimmera catchment pilot pro-
gram for salinity control in Australia (Wunder et al., 2008 :838),
can be regarded an ‘incomplete market with intermediary’
(Vatn, 2015 :227) where the government is acting on behalf of
the real users (Table 2).
5. In environmental and ecological economics, distinctions are
usually made between taxes, subsidies and cap-and-trade;
these are considered as three separate economic instruments.
These are founded in legislation but distinguished from con-
ventional (non-monetary) regulations (Table 1). Economic in-
struments and regulations are in turn distinguished from policy
instruments based on information or moral suasion (Common8 Republic of Ecuador Constitution of 2008, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Con
stitutions/Ecuador/english08.html, accessed 2 April 2014.and Stagl, 2005: 409).
The ﬁfth degree includes market-traded biodiversity offsets and
other markets for ecosystem services (MES) resembling cap-
and-trade systems. Most are mandatory and the largest pro-
grams are in the USA: wetland mitigation, stream mitigation,
and conservation banking (OECD, 2013). Conservation banking
is legally mandated biodiversity offsets, modelled after wetland
banking (McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010). The general idea,
according to guidance by the US agency Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS, 2003), is that market actors (e.g. landowners
willing to restore ecological values to compensate for other
actors’ degradation) join a habitat bank and are issued con-
servation credits by a government agency and subsequently
allowed to sell these credits to a developer (e.g. public trans-
portation agency or private developer). In this way ownership of
credits is transferred from the government to the bank, after
which the credits can be sold and re-sold on market conditions.
The government however controls this market by creating it
and by determining the number of credits (the cap), the initial
distribution and commands the demand for the credits, i.e. the
rules for who needs to buy credits and how many they need to
buy.
Non-mandatory biodiversity offsets with other buyers than
governmental bodies also belong to this level, as well as non-
mandatory PES. These user-ﬁnanced PES schemes are more
market-like since they are fully voluntary (not only on the
provider side). Besides, they are usually focused on a single
ecosystem service like the Vittel watershed protection in France
(Wunder et al., 2008:838–839) which also increases the degree
of commodiﬁcation. Globally, these non-mandatory offsets/
banking and PES programs embrace USD 10-17 million/year,
which is only 0.5–1 percent of the payments within the
mandatory programs (Milder et al., 2010).9
6. Financialisation is the sixth degree of ‘complete commodiﬁca-
tion’ and describes how the traded commodity is re-packaged
and re-sold as ﬁnancial instruments (e.g. bonds or derivatives).
The ﬁnancial ﬂows of PES or MES schemes are the basis (un-
derlying value) for this. Financialisation uses the ecosystems,
which are commodiﬁed by PES or MES schemes, as collateral for
investments and thereby signiﬁcantly enhances the degree of
commodiﬁcation. Based on Sullivan (2012) and Dempsey and
Robertson (2012) we deﬁne ﬁnancialisation as a process in
which ﬁnancial actors invest in units of conserved nature and
turn these investments into ﬁnancial instruments which are
traded on ﬁnancial markets.
The forest bonds proposed by WWF and Global Canopy Pro-
gramme offer an example of ﬁnancialisiation. They enable the
forest owners, who issue forest bonds, “to raise large-scale ﬁnance
now that will be repaid by existing and anticipated future income”
(Cranford et al., 2011: 6). The issuer of the bonds “will need to
convince investors that the cash ﬂows they plan to pay the bond
back with are sufﬁciently secure and predictable” (ibid.). A reliable
global REDDþ program10 would provide such predictability but
“support from the public sector through regulations or other
commitments will be needed to ensure that these cash ﬂows
materialise” (ibid.). Goldman Sachs is one of the ﬁnancial partners
in this proposal and a potential investor in such bonds.Mandatory PES embrace USD 1450 million/year and are all paid by government
bodies (Milder et al. 2010).
10 REDDþ stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest De-
gradation, conserving and sustainably managing forests and enhancing forest car-
bon stocks in Developing Countries.
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which has been discussed by Mandel et al. (2009). The govern-
ment might buy a ten-year biodiversity derivative for a species of
concern wherein a predeﬁned amount of funds would be released
by the seller if a species’ population falls below a threshold. Ba-
sically, the seller (issuer or writer of the derivative) is making the
bet that the species population will not fall below the threshold, or
that it can take measures to prevent such an occurrence whose
costs are within the range wherein they can make a proﬁt given
their proceeds from issuing the derivative.3. Framework for valuation and policy integration
In a broad economic sense valuation is about expressing a
willingness to make sacriﬁces to gain or protect something. In the
context of policy integration, the role of valuation is to raise
awareness and provide decision-support expressed in qualitative,
quantitative, and/or monetary terms (Table 2). The monetary va-
luation could be based on analytical calculations or the price from
hypothetical or real markets. Table 2 provides a comprehensive
and pluralistic framework of the relation between valuation and
policy integration: there is no unique relation between the in-
strument chosen for policy integration (horizontal axis) and the
political justiﬁcation for these instruments or the way nature’s
values are described in the columns. Table 2 is an attempt to ad-
dress both purposes and degrees of commodiﬁcation.
Much of the confusion in the discussion of commodiﬁcation
can be attributed the misunderstanding that economic instru-
ments assumes monetary valuation. Table 2 decouples the tech-
nical calculation of monetary valuation from policy instruments;
monetary valuation is not needed for the lower degrees (1–2 and
4) of commodiﬁcation and in the higher degrees (5–6) the price is
a result of market trade. Table 2 also suggests that both propo-
nents and critics to neoliberalism are making mistakes when they
associate economic instruments with neoliberal frameworks, ra-
ther than assessing the actual institutions and performance
(Dempsey and Robertson, 2012).
In reality, a PES scheme for grazing land can be justiﬁed by a
qualitative analysis of vulnerable species depending on grazing
land or targeted to forest communities as a tool for poverty alle-
viation. Reversely, a nature reserve can be justiﬁed by a cost-
beneﬁt analysis emphasising its extraordinary value for recreation
or public health. Again, it is the institutional design of a particular
policy instrument that determines the degree of commodiﬁcation.
However, public perceptions of commodiﬁcation and the political
legitimacy of the policy instrument will also be inﬂuenced by the
stated purpose and the valuation framework used to justify the
instrument.
We do not suggest that any method (column) of policy in-
tegration is better than the other. Qualitative information has
many similarities to SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunity,
Threat) analysis in business (Hanson et al., 2008) and is common
in business thinking on resilience (Hamel and Vlikangas, 2003).
The right column represents the ideal in neoclassical economics,
wherein all values are demonstrated in monetary terms in support
of efﬁciency calculations.11 We thank Katia Karousakis at the OECD for suggesting the term “economic
instruments” and pointing out that it is already used instead of ‘market-based in-
struments’ in many reports (e.g. OECD (2013)).
12 See also p. 22 in Report of the ad hoc open-ended working group on review
of implementation of the CBD on the work of its fourth meeting, UNEP/CBD/COP/
11/4, 21 June 2012.4. ‘Market-based instruments’ is a confusing term
‘Market-based instruments’ are generally assumed to include
taxes, subsidies and various cap-and-trade systems (e.g. Pearce
(2013)) but often include a “wide a range of hybrid instruments”
(Muradian and Gómez-Baggethun, 2013: 1118). Here we want to
emphasise the confusion between the role of prices and the role ofmarkets. A tax deﬁnitely uses the price signal but it is not a market
since the tax is imposed, not traded.
The price mechanism (or market mechanism) is something else:
it can be described as the autonomous mechanism that de-
termines the price in a market economy, as an equilibrium be-
tween supply and demand. The price signal is the result of the
price mechanism in competitive markets and also in less compe-
titive markets where a large producer or consumer can inﬂuence
the price. However, for taxes and subsidies, the price signal is a
result of a political decision to internalise externalities in the Pi-
gouvian sense. ‘Market-based instruments’ could properly be used
for the instruments under the 5th and 6th degrees of commodi-
ﬁcation but we prefer the more general term ‘economic instru-
ments’ to describe all policy instruments relying on the price
signal (monetary incentives), i.e. degree 4–6 (Tables 1 and 2).11
Voluntary market-like Coasean-type PES and biodiversity off-
sets (mandatory or voluntary) trading conservation credits con-
stitute the ﬁfth degree of commodiﬁcation because the price is the
result of supply and demand of the market. The price signal is
determined by the government in the 4th degree but by the market
in the 5th and 6th degrees of commodiﬁcation. Markets for eco-
system services (MES) indeed require more, not less, regulations
than the previous degrees if MES are to contribute to environ-
mental beneﬁts (Glicksman and Kaime, 2013). Principles of inter-
national law and safeguards can contribute to designing and im-
plementing MES including ensuring accountability in environ-
mental governance (Ituarte-Lima et al., 2012).12 Hence, ‘markets’
(reliance on market transactions) should not be understood
ideologically as opposite to regulations even though they are often
presented as such (Penca, 2013; Fletcher and Breitling, 2012).
Moreover, the transaction costs associated with MES are often high
compared to taxes, subsidies, and regulations, which suggests that
a priori assumptions about cost-effectiveness should be avoided
(Gómez-Baggethun and Muradian, 2015).5. Discussion
5.1. The diversity of PES designs
Table 2 suggests there is no direct link between the methodo-
logical approach to valuation (non-monetary or monetary) and the
choice of policy instrument. Concerning PES, Table 2 clariﬁes three
issues. First, subsidy-like government-ﬁnanced PES, also called
Pigouvian-type PES or Compensation for ecosystem services (CES),
represent a lower degree of commodiﬁcation compared to the
much smaller market-like Coasean-type PES.
Second, subsidy-like PES can be further differentiated based on
stated purpose and use of valuation framework, as suggested by
the three columns. If society wishes to use monetary incentives (or
rewards) but avoid that monetary valuation reduces “dignities”
(intrinsic values) to “commodities” (instrumental values), CES may
be an option.
Third, the stated purpose may sometimes appear to be incon-
sistent to the actual institutional design of the program. The na-
tional PES program of Costa Rica and CES program of Ecuador are
similar in terms of the degree of commodiﬁcation, but are differ-
ent in the particular design. In both countries, these differences
have been exaggerated by the political justiﬁcations for the
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ﬂexible the design of PES/CES programs can be and how they can
be implemented and justiﬁed to accommodate country-speciﬁc
concerns to gain legitimacy which is of key importance within the
CBD (Farooqui and Schultz, 2012; Ogwal and Schultz, 2014).
Sometimes the deﬁnition of PES includes legally mandated
private payments which are required to offset environmental im-
pacts, e.g. wetland mitigation or habitat banking, as well as the
price premium for eco-certiﬁed products that reaches the produ-
cers of ES (Scherr and McNeely, 2008; Milder et al., 2010). How-
ever, we believe it makes sense analytically i) to distinguish be-
tween PES and liabilities to compensate for damage (offsets or
ecological compensation) regardless if they are mandatory or not;
and ii) to distinguish between economic instruments on the one
hand and eco-certiﬁcation on the other. Although an eco-label
often functions as a price premium for producers (monetary in-
centive), it can also be regarded, from a policy perspective, as an
instrument based on information and moral suasion (Common
and Stagl, 2005: 409).
5.2. Biodiversity offsets and ecological compensation
Ecological compensation schemes, including biodiversity off-
sets, are often controversial. Proponents emphasise that it is fair
(analogous to the Polluter Pays Principle) that developers are re-
quired to pay for restoration activities so as to offset the de-
gradation they cause and this may also steer development away
from areas with high values for biodiversity and ES because these
are expensive to compensate for (Conway et al., 2013): vii).
Landowners who invest in biodiversity and ES can enter contracts
and receive payments from the developers rather than from tax-
payers. Interviews with private landowners in Germany and Aus-
tralia have noted the economic attractiveness of entering a long-
term maintenance contract with a compensation agency, as it
ensured a stable source of income (Tucker et al., 2013:193;
O’Connor, 2009:15).
Critics of biodiversity offsets such as Forest Peoples Programme
(2011) are concerned that ecosystems, as well as their functions
for livelihood opportunities, are not fully replaceable. Local people
in one region normally depend on the biodiversity and ES in that
area for their livelihoods and other beneﬁts. There is a risk that
such schemes will offer incentives for developers and adminis-
trators “to downplay or ignore the requirement to ﬁrst avoid and
reduce their impacts under the false impression that any impact
can be compensated for” (Quétier and Lavorel, 2011: 2991. This is
sometimes referred to as the restoration myth or a ‘license to
trash’ (Dickie et al., 2010:237). If biodiversity offset policies allow
for the approval of land exploitation that would otherwise not
have been accepted, biodiversity objectives as well as livelihood
opportunities for local communities can be compromised.
This can be avoided only if the avoidance step of the mitiga-
tions hierarchy is respected, which means that ‘no-go’ areas are
stipulated (Conway et al., 2013: viii) and “current rules to decide
whether developments should go ahead do not change” (Dickie
et al., 2010: 237). Hence, the proponents emphasise that in-
troduction of a biodiversity offset scheme must not result in less
stringent regulations.
Despite this agreement, the largest offset program, US Wetland
mitigation, has focused too much on the compensation part and
neglected the earlier stages of the mitigation hierarchy (Hough
and Robertson, 2009). The result is poor performance (Kihslinger,
2008; Turner et al., 2001). For example, an evaluation of 391
wetland offset projects in Massachusetts showed that 54% were
not in compliance with the wetland regulations (Brown and Ve-
neman, 2001) and Ambrose and Lee (2004) found that 46% of the
250 sites surveyed in California failed to replace key wetland ESwhich had been determined by the state.
When the whole spectrum of institutional design from non-
market liabilities (ecological compensation) to market-like trade
(biodiversity offsets) is acknowledged, considerable ﬂexibility is
shown. This is promising since it allows for the emergence of
country-speciﬁc programs with a cultural-political adaptation to
gain legitimacy (Hahn, 2011). This is also a risk because the devil is
in the detail; small changes in the institutional design may have
large consequences for the performance. We give four examples:
First, weighing the development interest against the con-
servation interest at the site of proposed development must not be
compromised by the (false) promise that the damage can and will
be entirely compensated for elsewhere. A successful program
should result in a reduction of permits obtained by developers
because the liability to ﬁnance restoration at the compensation
site increases costs, thereby deterring development projects with
marginal proﬁtability.
Second, and related to the ﬁrst, even an ideally designed pro-
gram may fail for ecological reasons, if restoration turns out to be
much more complicated than anticipated (Hilderbrand et al.,
2005; Maron et al., 2012).
Third, a successful program would align the interest of (city)
planners with the interest of developers. Planners often try to
steer development away from remaining green areas and devel-
opers would also avoid green land with high biological values
since these would be expensive to compensate for.
Fourth, simple metrics (one acre equals one credit) and use of
market trade might have lowered transaction costs of the large US
programs but this cannot be regarded as cost-effective if the
achieved effect, the actual performance of the program, is low. The
evaluations referred to above suggest low performance. Briggs
et al. (2009) warn that “[w]ithout careful regulation, habitat banks
could offer low-cost compensation as a result of cutting corners on
conservation, and the market would reward poorly managed
banks and thus harm conservation efforts” (p. 117). The dichotomy
government regulations vs. market is false (Vatn, 2015) and this is
particularly obvious for ecological compensation/offsets since
good performance seem to be a function of a comprehensive
government regulation (Dickie et al., 2010: 237), i.e. safeguards.6. Conclusion
The issue of monetary valuation of biodiversity and ES is a
never-ending debate within ecological economics because it runs
counter to one of the central beliefs within this community,
namely that natural capital cannot be substituted for. However,
there is an emerging scientiﬁc consensus that the price signals
used in PES are in general set to compensate for opportunity costs
and hence cannot be regarded as a monetary valuation of the
desired ES. We also ﬁnd that biodiversity offsets, designed with
strong safeguards, would properly be named ‘ecological compen-
sation’ and have very little to do with market trade or valuation of
ES. Hence, these economic instruments should not by default be
associated to neither monetary valuation nor neoliberalism.
Dempsey and Robertson (2012) argue that many social scien-
tists “have largely positioned themselves as critical” to PES and
other ES policies and associated these to commodiﬁcation and “the
neoliberalization of nature” (pp. 762, 772). Instead Dempsey and
Robertson suggest “a useful solidarity with people engaged,
through ES policy, in opposition to business-as-usual resource
development” (p. 773). Our results support that ES policies in
general can be useful to counter some of the market failures of
business-as-usual and hence should not be understood as ‘market-
based instruments’ or ‘neoliberalisation of nature.’ At the same
time, we have used ‘commodiﬁcation’ as an analytical, not
T. Hahn et al. / Ecosystem Services 16 (2015) 74–82 81normative, term and found that all ES policies, by using an in-
strumental (human wellbeing) perspective, do involve at least low
degrees of commodiﬁcation.
The strength of markets, searching for lowest cost for provision,
may result in low quality for complex ‘products’ such as con-
servation of biodiversity and ES, unless combined with strong
safeguards including enforcement. Markets may entail low trans-
action costs and be cost-effective regarding simple products but
this should not be assumed for complex products.
The institutional diversity and plurality in understanding and
implementing various biodiversity ﬁnancing mechanisms, espe-
cially economic instruments, gives ﬂexibility for the 194 Parties of
the CBDto adapt these instruments to their national political and
cultural context. This ﬂexibility in turn enhances prospects for
reaching international agreement on biodiversity ﬁnancing me-
chanisms and enhances policy options in each country.Acknowledgements
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